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DISCRIMINATION CASES IN THE 2000 TERM
Eileen Kaufman'
The Court decided several civil rights cases last term,
covering a range of issues affecting discrimination claimants in
employment, public accommodations and federally funded
programs and activities. The decisions ranged in complexity, in
significance and in the Court's ability to agree: two cases
produced unanimous decisions; 2 one was decided seven to two;
3
and two produced what has now become the familiar five to four
acrimonious split on the Court.
4
Alexander v. Sandoval.
By far, the most important of the civil rights cases decided
last term is Alexander v. Sandoval,5 where the Court held that
there is not a private right of action under Title VI in cases of
disparate impact discrimination.6  Title VI prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in all
federally funded programs.7 Pursuant to § 602 of the Act, which
authorizes federal agencies to promulgate implementing
Professor of Law and former Vice Dean, Touro College Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center. B.A., Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York
University, 1975; L.L.M., New York University, 1992. Prior to serving as
Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Touro Law Center, Professor Kaufman
was a Managing Attorney at Westchester Legal Services, Inc. Professor
Kaufman is a Reporter for the New York Pattern Jury Instructions. She has
published primarily in the area of civil rights law.
2 Pollard v. E.I. Du Pont, 532 U.S. 843 (2001); Clark v. County of
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
3 P.G.A. Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661(2001).
4 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
5Alexander, 532 U.S. at 275.6 id.
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 252 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994)), states in
pertinent part: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
1
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regulations,8 the Department of Justice and the Department of
Transportation issued regulations prohibiting recipients of federal
assistance from adopting policies that have the effect of
discriminating on the basis of race or national origin. 9 In other
words, the regulations cover disparate impact discrimination.
The practice challenged in Alexander v. Sandoval was
Alabama's decision to administer state driver's license
examinations only in English. 10  Sandoval argued that this
practice had the effect of subjecting non-English speaking
individuals to discrimination based on their national origin." In
order to prevail on that claim, Sandoval did not have to prove
intent to discriminate. Indeed, that is the importance of disparate
impact theory; claims of disparate impact discrimination require a
type of proof far easier to establish than intent to discriminate. 12
In order to make out a prima facie claim based on
disparate impact theory, the plaintiff need only show that the
challenged practice or policy has an adverse and disproportionate
impact on a protected category. 3 If plaintiff makes that showing,
then, utilizing Title VI principles, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show a substantial, legitimate justification, 14 at
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) states in pertinent part: "Each Federal
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant loan, or contract other
than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provision. .... "
9See, e.g., 28 CFR § 42.1004(b)(2) (1999). The Department of Justice
regulation forbids funding recipients to: "utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
because of their race, color, or national origin ......
'oAlexander, 532 U.S. at 279.
|Id.
12 See, e.g., Hazen v. Biggens, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). In contrasting
disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, the Court stated that in a
disparate treatment claim, proof of a discriminatory motive is critical, but such
a motive is not required under a disparate impact cause of action.
13 id.
"4 Id. The Court specifically stated that the practice that caused the
discriminatory impact had to be justified by a business necessity.
[Vol 18
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which point the plaintiff has the opportunity to show that an
alternative exists that lacks the discriminatory effect.
15
As stated above, Sandoval's challenge of Alabama's
English only rule was based on disparate impact theory, a theory
encompassed by the agency regulations. Sandoval argued that the
English only rule had an adverse and disproportionate impact on
persons based on their national origin. 16 Both the district court
17
and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.18
The Supreme Court did not address the question of
whether the English only policy did in fact have the effect of
discriminating on the basis of national origin.19 Even more
surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of
whether the disparate impact regulations of the Department of
Justice and the Department of Transportation were authorized by
the statute. Instead, the Court assumed for the purpose of
deciding the case that the regulations were valid, but held that no
private right of action exists to enforce them.
20
This was an exceedingly surprising and notable decision
given earlier Supreme Court decisions that had firmly established
that private individuals may sue to enforce Title VI.21 Further,
the decision was surprising given the virtual unanimity among the
circuit courts that a private right of action exists to enforce
regulations issued pursuant to Title VI. 22  With Justice Scalia
is See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).16 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 279.
17 Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (Ala. 1998).
18 Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (Cal. 1999).
'9 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 279.20 Id. at 281, 292.
21 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that the failure of the
San Francisco school system to provide English language instruction to non-
English speaking students violated § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
22 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 295 n.1 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens
specifically stated, "Just about every Court of Appeals has either explicitly or
implicitly held that a private cause of action exists to enforce all of the
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writing for a five to four majority, the Court based its decision on
its conclusions that Title VI does not itself prohibit disparate
impact discrimination and that Congress did not intend to create a
private right of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations,
even assuming that those regulations were themselves valid under
the statute.23
What makes the decision so peculiar is its unwillingness to
directly address the question of the validity of the disparate
impact regulations. Instead, as previously stated, the Court
assumes, without deciding, that the regulations are valid.
However, if the regulations are valid, that means Congress
intended to allow the agencies to prohibit disparate impact
discrimination. But, if Congress so intended, then presumably
Congress intended a private right of action to enforce those
regulations. It would be a strained statutory construction to
conclude, in one breath, that Congress intended the agencies to
determine the types of discrimination covered by Title VI and, in
the very next breath, to conclude that Congress did not intend to
permit private individuals, victims of that discrimination, to
enforce those rights.
If, on the other hand, Congress did not authorize the
agencies to prohibit disparate impact discrimination, if Congress
clearly intended that Title VI only cover intentional
discrimination, then the regulations are simply invalid and not
enforceable by anyone. The decision would have been more
straightforward and defensible had it decided the question of the
validity of the regulations one way or the other.
The dissent, which was written by Justice Stevens and
joined by the familiar grouping of Justices Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, is explicit and rather blunt in its criticism.24  It
characterizes the majority decision as "unfounded in our
precedent and hostile to decades of settled expectations." 25 The
dissent reads the relevant precedents in a starkly different manner
3 Id. at 278, 292.
24 Id. at 293-317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 294.
[Vol 18
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than does the majority.26 For example, while the majority reads
Cannon v. University of Chicago27 as establishing nothing beyond
the fact that a private right of action exists under the statute, the
dissent points out that Cannon was itself a disparate impact claim
and thus stands in direct conflict with the holding reached by the
majority. 28
Further, the dissent reads the relevant portions of the
statute, § 60129 and 602,30 not as advancing different and separate
agendas, but rather as creating one integrated remedial scheme.
3'
Section 601 prohibits discrimination in federally funded
programs.32 Section 602 authorizes the agencies to promulgate
implementing regulations.33  Under the dissent's view, the
disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602 do not
create new rights, but rather serve the purpose of effectuating the
anti-discrimination goals and mandate of § 601. 34 Indeed, the
dissent points out that regulations prohibiting policies that have a
disparate impact are not necessarily aimed only at non-intentional
discrimination. a The dissent explains that many policies whose
very intent is to discriminate are purposely expressed in race
neutral terms, and proving intentional discrimination in those
cases is virtually impossible.36 An agency's adoption of disparate
impact regulations may very well reflect a determination by that
agency that there is widespread intentional discrimination
practiced by an entity that the agency is charged with regulating,
but that such discrimination is difficult to prove directly. 37 In
order to get at that discrimination and implement the anti-
discrimination mandate of the statute, it makes sense to look at
26 Id. at 294-301.
27 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
2 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 298.
29 42 U.S.C. 2000d.
30 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1.
a3 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 304.
32 42 U.S.C. 2000d.
33 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1.
34 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 304.
31 Id. at 306-07.





Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAW REVIEW
what is typically the most probative evidence of intent.38 What is
most probative is objective evidence of what actually happened;
the adverse, disproportionate impact on a protected category,
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor.39
Under the dissent's view, the disparate impact regulations
are not seen as creating new rights, but rather as part and parcel
of a single, integrated, remedial scheme aimed at prohibiting
discrimination in all programs and activities that receive federal
money.40
Finally, the dissent argues that well-settled principles of
administrative law, particularly the Chevron doctrine,4' counsel
in favor of deferring to agency interpretations of the statute's
breadth.
42
An interesting aspect of the divide between the majority
and the dissent in this case, a theme that also emerges in Circuit
City v. Adams,43 has to do with each side of the five to four split
accusing the other of ignoring the will of Congress in favor of its
own policy preferences. 44 The justices have moved beyond mere
criticism on the merits to what could be considered a more
political critique, one that impugns the other side's motivations
and challenges, as a matter of principle, the process of judicial
decision making.45
Thus, Justice Stevens characterizes the majority opinion in
Alexander as "the unconscious product of the majority's profound
distaste for implied causes of action rather than an attempt to
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 543 n.20.
41 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467
U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (noting that when agencies charged with
administering a broadly-worded statute offer regulations interpreting that
statute or giving concrete guidance as to its implementation, that interpretation
of the statute's breadth is controlling unless it presents an unreasonable
construction of the statute).
42 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 309.
4' 530 U.S. 105 (2001).
44 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 316-17.
45 This theme is clearly part of the Bush v. Gore debate, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
[Vol 18
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discern the intent of the Congress that enacted Title VI." 46 He
accuses the majority of adopting a methodology that "blinds itself
to important evidence of congressional intent" in order to
"impose its own preferences as to the availability of judicial
remedies." 47  On the other side, Justice Scalia accuses the
dissenting judges of trying for "one last drink," by finding an
implied right of action which constitutes "an act of judicial self-
indulgence."48  The bitterness between the majority and the
dissent was reflected by the fact that Justice Stevens chose to read
portions of his dissent from the bench, expressing not only
criticism of the decision on the merits but criticism of the Court's
reaching out to decide an issue in the absence of any conflict in
the lower federal courts.
Why did I begin by saying that Alexander v. Sandoval was
the most important of the civil rights decisions of the term?
There are two reasons. First and most obviously, by limiting
Title VI to only intentional acts of discrimination, the Court has
eliminated private rights of action to challenge the ways in which
discrimination typically manifests itself. It is the very rare
occasion where a federal policy is capable of being challenged on
the ground of overt, facial racial discrimination. Far more
typically, discrimination is more subtle and expressed in terms of
adverse and disproportionate impact on a protected category. By
limiting Title VI to programs that are overtly discriminatory, the
Court has dramatically limited its usefulness as a tool to address
discrimination in federally financed programs.
While theoretically a federal agency could attempt to
enforce its own regulations and could even attempt to cut off
federal funds, that is not a sufficient remedy, in part due to the
lack of resources that have historically been devoted for that
purpose. In fact, the brief submitted by the Government in
support of the plaintiffs acknowledged that "private enforcement
provides a necessary supplement to government enforcement."
49
46Alexander, 532 U.S. at 317.
47 Id. at 313.
481Id. at 311.
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Second, there is reason to be concerned that the decision
will be extended to other civil rights statutes, most likely Title
IX,5° Title VI's "gender-based twin. " 51 That means that private
plaintiffs alleging gender discrimination would have to prove
intentional discrimination on the basis of gender. Claims of
disproportionate impact would not be actionable.
One significant unanswered question raised by the
decision is, if the disparate impact regulations are valid, which
the Court assumed for purposes of the decision, can they be
enforced under § 1983?52 In the first decision to address that
question post-Alexander, a New Jersey district court held the
disparate impact regulations could be enforced pursuant to
§ 1983, however that ruling was reversed on appeal.53 That case
is South Camden Citizens in Action v. The New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection,54 involving a claim that
the opening of a sixty million-dollar cement plant would have an
adverse, disparate impact on the health of African Americans and
Hispanics. 5 Whether or not § 1983 offers a vehicle to enforce
the disparate impact regulations, assuming the validity of those
regulations, remains an open and obviously very significant
question.
Circuit City v. Adams
The second case of significant import to discrimination
claimants is Circuit City v. Adams,56 where the same five to four
30 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq. (1994)).
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et. seq.
32 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides in pertinent part: "Every person who
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable."
13 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N. J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F. 3d
771 (3d Cir. 2001).
14 274 F.3d 771.
55 id.
m 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
[Vol 18
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majority held that the FAA, the Federal Arbitration Act, 7
exempts only employment contracts of transportation workers.
58
What does this mean? It means that claimants like Saint Clair
Adams, who signed employment contracts containing arbitration
clauses, may not seek judicial review of their state or federal
employment discrimination claims, but are bound by the
arbitration clause.59
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority and styled his
decision in seemingly innocuous, non-controversial statutory
construction terms. The precise issue in the case was one of
statutory construction. 6°  The FAA exempts "contracts of
employment for seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. "61 The
question in the case was how to interpret the phrase "any other
class of workers. "62 Does the exemption apply to all workers
engaged in commerce or to a more limited category of workers?
The Court applied the maxim ejusdem generic to answer
that question, which means that general words following specific
words should be construed to embrace only objects similar to the
specifically enumerated objects.63 Since the general words "other
class of workers engaged in ... commerce" follows the specific
categories of seamen and railroad employees, the Court construed
the term to mean transportation workers as opposed to all other
workers in interstate commerce. 64 Thus, the FAA exempts only
57 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (year).
8 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 105.
'9 Id. at 109-10. When Saint Clair Adams applied for a job at Circuit City
she signed an application form which included the following provision: "I
agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or
controversies arising out of... my application, employment and/or cessation
of employment... exclusively by final and binding arbitration..."
60 Id. at 110 (reasoning that if there was an exception in relation to
arbitration agreements in employment contracts it had to be premised on the
language of the statute itself).
61 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
62 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114.
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contracts of employment of transportation workers, meaning that
all other employment contracts are subject to the FAA.65
One interesting aspect of the decision involves the court's
chameleon-like commerce clause jurisprudence. The question was
whether the Court should interpret the phrase "engaged
in ... commerce" in light of the Court's commerce clause
jurisprudence of 1925, when the statute was enacted. 66  The
Court refused, saying "(i)t would be unwieldy ... to deconstruct
statutory Commerce Clause phrases depending upon the year of a
particular statutory enactment. " 67 Given how dramatically the
Court's commerce clause decisions have changed over the
years,6s that would be quite a challenge.
Another interesting aspect of the decision is the extent to
which the majority opinion produces an anomalous federalism
result. Keep in mind that the five justices forming the majority
are the five who have recently revolutionized the Court's
federalism jurisprudence. Yet, the majority rejected the
argument advanced by twenty-two states69 that applying the FAA
to employment contracts in effect preempts state employment
laws which limit the ability of employers and employees to enter
into arbitration agreements. 70  The states argued that such a
holding infringes upon the states' traditional role in regulating
employment relationships, including prohibiting employees from
contracting away their right to pursue state law discrimination
claims in court.71 The Supreme Court's response was, "don't
blame us," as prior decisions of the Court had already established
that Congress intended the FAA to apply in state courts and to
65 Id. at 119.
66Id. at 116.67Id. at 118.
" Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 116. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
69 The attorney generals of each of 22 states in disagreement filed Amicus
Briefs with the Court.




Touro Law Review, Vol. 18 [2002], No. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss1/3
DISCRIMINATION CASES
preempt state anti-discrimination laws to the contrary.72 Further,
the Court pointed to the benefits of arbitration over litigation,
particularly the benefit of avoiding the high costs of litigation.73
As in Alexander v. Sandoval, the dissent is harshly critical
of the majority for using a "method of statutory interpretation
that is deliberately uninformed and hence unconstrained. 
"74
Again, the dissent accuses the majority of deliberately ignoring
statutory meaning in order to substitute its own preference, in this
case for binding arbitration of employment discrimination
disputes. 75 "Such an approach produces a result consistent with
the Court's own views of how things should be, but defeats the
very purpose for which the provision was enacted." 76 According
to the dissent, the FAA was intended to cover commercial
contracts and not employment contracts. 77  In fact, organized
labor's opposition to the Act was based on the disparity in
bargaining power between employers and employees, which is
why the exemption for employment contracts was included. 8
According to the dissent, the majority "simply ignores the
interest of the unrepresented employee ... and skews its
interpretation to its own policy preferences. "79  The dissent
quotes Justice Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel in criticizing
the so-called "'minimalist' judge 'who holds that the purpose of
the statute may be learned only from its language,'" but who in
fact exercises more "discretion than the judge 'who will seek
guidance from every reliable source.'" 
80
Among the issues left unresolved by the decision is how to
define transportation workers. Does the category include truck
72 Id. The Court specifically cited its decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), for ruling that Congress intended the FAA to pre-
empt state anti-arbitration laws.73Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123.
74 Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7s Id. at 132-33.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 124.
71 Id. at 132-33.
79 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 132-33.
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drivers? Does the category include ticket agents for airlines?
Does it include travel agents? Other issues left unresolved
include whether the substantive rights and remedies provided by
anti-discrimination statutes can be lost, rights such as punitive
damages and attorneys' fees. Most lower courts have agreed that
employees do not lose the remedies available under federal law
by signing binding arbitration agreements.
Perhaps the most important issue left unresolved by
Circuit City is what is the scope of the EEOC's power to pursue
claims on behalf of discrimination claimants who are themselves
precluded from seeking judicial relief by virtue of binding
arbitration agreements? That issue is likely to be resolved this
term in a case entitled EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.81 The EEOC
argued that even where the individual claimant is precluded from
bringing suit, the agency has the authority to sue employers for
back pay, reinstatement and damages on behalf of those
discrimination claimants. 82 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the
agency could seek injunctions to stop illegal workplace practices,
but could not seek back pay or damages. The same result has
been reached in the Second Circuit in EEOC v. Kidder
Peabody.84 However, the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. Frank's
Nursery and Crafts85 concluded that the EEOC was not precluded
from pursuing claims for monetary relief.86 The Court is likely
to resolve this question and this split in Waffle House.87
81 534 U.S. 279, 122 S. Ct. 754, 766 (2002) Subsequent to the symposium,
the Supreme Court decided Waffle House and held that an agreement between
an employer and their employee to arbitrate employment related disputes does
not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief.
82 id.
83 EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 2000).
84 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
85 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
86 id.
87 122 S. Ct at 766 (January 19, 2002). Subsequent to the symposium the
Supreme Court resolved the split in the Circuits and agreed with the Sixth
Circuit's holding that the EEOC was not precluded from pursuing claims for
monetary relief where the employer and employee had previously settled.
Vol 18
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PGA Tour v. Martin
The case on last term's docket of most interest to golfers
was PGA Tour v. Martin,88 raising ADA issues within the context
of tournament golf. Specifically, the issue was whether Title III
of the Americans with Disabilities Act89 required the PGA tour to
allow Casey Martin to use a golf cart during those stages of a
PGA tournament where the PGA rules require participants to
walk the course.
90
That issue required the Court to decide whether the ADA
protects access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified
entrant with a disability and whether a disabled contestant may be
"denied the use of a golf cart because it would 'fundamentally
alter the nature' of the tournaments to allow him to ride when all
other contestants must walk." 9 In a seven to two decision, with
the Court's avid golfer Justice Stevens writing for the majority,
the Court held that PGA golf tours are within the coverage of the
ADA and permitting Casey Martin to use a golf cart would not
fundamentally alter the nature of the event.92
Casey Martin suffers from Klippel-Trenauney-Weber
Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder that obstructs the
flow of blood from his right leg back to his heart. 93 Walking
causes him pain, fatigue, and anxiety, and creates a significant
risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots and fracturing his
tibia in a way that might require amputation. 94 Based on this
disorder, Casey Martin is indisputably a disabled person within
the meaning of the ADA. 95 The Act defines disabled person as
an individual with "a physical or a mental impairment that
88532 U.S. 661 (2001).
89 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990).
90 P.G.A. Tour, 532 U.S. at 664.
91 Id. at 695-96.
92Id. at 666.
9 Id. at 668.
94 Id.
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substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
an individual." 
96
The ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled
individuals in employment (Title I),97 in public services (Title
II), 98 and by public accommodations (Title 111).99 Title III, which
is the section of the Act relevant to this case, provides that:
[N]o individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of
public accommodation. 100
The statutory definition of "public accommodation"
explicitly includes golf courses. 101  The PGA argued in the
district court that it is "a private club exempt from Title III, 102
an argument not advanced in the Supreme Court.' 0 3 Nor did the
PGA advance an argument it had made in the circuit court that
the competitors' area behind the ropes was not a public
accommodation.1°4 Rather, the PGA's argument on the coverage
issue in the Supreme Court was that "competing golfers are not
members of the class of persons protected by Title III." 105 The
PGA's argument was that Title III protects clients and customers,
not people like Casey Martin who is functioning as a provider of
entertainment like an actor in a theatre production. 10 6 Casey
96 id.
9' 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2001).
98 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2001).
99 42 U.S.C § 12182 (2001).
100 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a) (2001).
'0' 42 U.S.C. §12181(7) (L) (2001).
102 Martin v. PGA Tour, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204
F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 532 U.S. 661, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
'03 P.G.A. Tour, 532 U.S. at 661.
104 P.G.A. Tour, 204 F.3d at 994.
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Martin's claim, according to the PGA, "is nothing more than a
straightforward discrimination-in-the-workplace complaint"
which is not covered by Title III but would come within Title I,
which covers employment, if Casey Martin were an employee
and not an independent contractor. 107
The Court rejected this argument, finding that even if
Title III is limited to clients and customers, Martin qualifies as
someone who paid the PGA several thousand dollars for the
chance to compete. 10 8  Thus, the Court concludes that "as a
public accommodation during its tours and qualifying rounds, [the
PGA] may not discriminate against either spectators or
competitors on the basis of disability." 109
Having decided the coverage issue, the question
becomes whether denying Martin the use of a golf cart constitutes
discrimination within the meaning of the Act. 110 It seems that it
is the part of the decision that has caused the stir, at least within
the golfing world. Title III defines discrimination as:
[A] failure to make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures, when such
modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities,
unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations.111
There was no dispute that allowing Martin to use a cart
constitutes a "reasonable modification" and one that is necessary
if he is to compete. 112 The dispute was whether allowing him to
107 id.
los Id. at 680.
'09 Id. at 681.
"0 Id. at 681-82.
. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2001).
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use the cart would "fundamentally alter the nature of the
event." 
113
Here is where the case loses its significance beyond the
narrow, albeit passionate, world of athletes in general and more
particularly golfers. On one side of the debate you have Arnold
Palmer, Jack Nicklaus and Ken Venturi who testified that fatigue
can be a critical factor in a tournament, and that permitting one
golfer to use a cart would give him a competitive advantage over
the other players who must walk the course. 14 For example,
Arnold Palmer testified that fatigue can cost you one stroke or
more and that many a tournament has been lost by one stroke.
115
Jack Nicklaus testified that golfers are required to walk the course
because physical fitness and fatigue are part of the game. 116 Ken
Venturi opined that the use of golf carts would fundamentally
alter the nature of the competition because it would remove the
fatigue factor. 117
The Supreme Court was thus faced with the monumental
task of deciding what in fact is fundamental to the game of golf.
The Court decided that a fundamental alteration could be affected
in either of two ways: by changing an essential aspect of the
game for everyone, as by changing the diameter of the hole from
3 to 6 inches; or by giving a disabled person an advantage over
others and thus fundamentally altering the character of the
competition because the ADA requires equal access to the event,
not an equal chance to win."18 Seven Justices of the Court
decided that permitting a disabled golfer to use a golf cart would
neither alter such an essential aspect of the game of golf as to be
unacceptable nor give Casey Martin an advantage over the other
golfers so as to alter the nature of the competition.119
The Court justifies its decision on its review of the history
of golf, which supports the conclusion that shot-making is the
1" id.
114 Id. at 670-71.
' Id. at 671 n.13.
16 Id. at 671 n.14.
117 Id. at 671 n.15.
.. P.G.A. Tour, 532 U.S. at 670-71.
" 9 Id. at 690-91.
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truly essential aspect of the game and that walking the course is
far from universally required and thus not essential to the
game. 120 The Court relied on the "Rules of Golf," on the fact
that golf carts are permitted in the open qualifying events for
PGA tournaments and in senior events, 121 on the fact that
conditions can never be truly equalized for all players given
changing weather conditions and given luck, 122 on the fact that
the majority of tournament golfers prefer to walk the course to
relieve stress or for other strategic reasons, 123 and finally on the
fact that, at least according to one professor of physiology, the
calories expended in walking a golf course is approximately 500
calories, "nutritionally.. .less than a Big Mac," 124 meaning that
the fatigue factor cannot be deemed significant.
One aspect of the Court's decision that merits attention is
the Court's insistence that the ADA requires an individualized
inquiry. 125 Thus, deciding whether Casey Martin was entitled to
the modification he sought required an inquiry as to whether
allowing him to use a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of
the PGA tournament. 126 The Court determined that the answer to
that question was no because if the purpose of the walking rule is
to subject players to fatigue, which in turn may influence the
outcome of tournaments, that purpose is not undermined by
permitting Martin to use a cart since he "endures greater fatigue
even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by
walking." 127 What the modification does is "allow Martin the
chance to qualify for and compete in the athletic events [that the
PGA] offers to those members of the public who have the skill
and desire to enter. That is exactly what the ADA requires." 1
28
320 Id. at 683-84.
121 Id. at 687.
122 id.
123id.
'24 Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
125 P.G.A. Tour, 532 U.S. at 690.
126 id.
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The most entertaining part of the case is, of course,
Justice Scalia's dissent (joined by Justice Thomas), a dissent that
the majority characterizes as a "post-modem view of What is
Sport." 129 Justice Scalia argues that Title III covers only clients
and customers and that Casey Martin is neither. 30 For example,
Title III would cover spectators at a zoo but not the "animal
handler... bringing in the latest panda;" it would cover
spectators at a theater, but not the theatre performers.' 3 ' Justice
Scalia equates competing for entry into the PGA tour to
competing in an open audition for the Sopranos. 32 Individuals
trying out for those events are not, in Justice Scalia's view,
converted into customers merely because they perform in places
of public accommodation. 1
33
Justice Scalia's distinctive sarcasm emerges when he
argues that even if Casey Martin is a consumer of the "privilege"
of the PGA tour competition, the ADA does not authorize the
Court to alter the rules of the PGA competition. 34 Deciding
whether walking the course is a fundamental aspect of golf is to
Justice Scalia an incredibly difficult and incredibly silly question.
Let me give you a flavor of his dissent:
It has been rendered the solemn duty of the
Supreme Court of the United States, laid upon it
by Congress in pursuance of the Federal
Government's power 'to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States' to
decide What is Golf. I am sure that the Framers of
the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of King
James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it
interfered with the practice of archery, fully
expected that sooner or later the paths of golf and
government, the law and the links, would once
129 Id.
30 Id. at 689 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"3 P.G.A. Tour, 532 U.S. at 693.
132 Id. at 696-97.
133 Id. at 697.
134 Id. at 699.
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again cross, and that the judges of this august
Court would some day have to wrestle with that
age-old jurisprudential question, for which their
years of study in the law have so well prepared
them: Is someone riding around a golf course from
shot to shot really a golfer? The answer, we learn,
is yes. The Court ultimately concludes, and it will
henceforth be the Law of the Land, that walking is
not a 'fundamental' aspect of golf.135
Justice Scalia ends his dissent by predicting that the
Court's emphasis on the need for individualized determinations
will spawn a generation of litigation as parents of a Little League
player with attention deficit disorder tries to convince a judge that
their son's disability makes it at least twenty-five percent more
difficult for him to hit a pitched ball, thereby entitling him to four
strikes, which would then require the court to decide whether in
baseball three strikes are metaphysically necessary. 136 Justice
Scalia concludes with a reference to Animal Farm and a quote by
Kurt Vonnegut, "The year was 2001 and everybody was finally
equal." 1
37
The ADA case on the docket this term is likely to have
more long-lasting significance than PGA v. Martin. The case,
Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 38 raises an important
definition issue. Is an individual disabled within the meaning of
the Act when the individual's impairment prevents her from
performing her existing job but not other jobs? The impairment
issue in Toyota Motor Manufacturing is carpal tunnel syndrome
that prevents the plaintiff from working on the Toyota assembly
line.
139
' Id. at 699-700 (citations omitted).
136 P.G.A. Tour, 532 U.S. at 702-03.
137 KURT VONNEGUT, ANIMAL FARM.
138 224 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 970 (U.S. Apr. 16,
200,1) (No. 00-1089).
139 Id. at 843. Subsequent to the symposium, the Court held that carpal
tunnel syndrome is not a disability within the meaning of the Act because it did
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Pollard v. E.L DuPont
The Court decided two Title VII cases last term. The first
is Pollard v. E.I. duPont,140 which represents an important win
for discrimination plaintiffs. In this case, the Court unanimously
held that a front pay award is not a form of compensatory
damages and is therefore not subject to the statutory caps
contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.141
Sharon Pollard brought a Title VII action based on sexual
harassment. 142 Both the District and the Circuit Court of Appeals
found that she was subjected to blatant sexual harassment by co-
workers and that although her supervisors were aware of the
harassment, they failed to take appropriate steps to stop the
offending behavior or discipline the responsible parties.
143
Plaintiff worked in a DuPont plant in Memphis, Tennessee, in a
section that made hydrogen peroxide. 144 Plaintiffs co-workers
made it clear that they did not want a woman working in their
section.145 They protested her leadership of DuPont's program of
encouraging workers to participate in Take Your Daughter to
Work Day; they disrupted the machinery that Ms. Pollard was
responsible for operating; they created false fire alarms so that
she had to deal with nonexistent problems; they cut the tires on
her bicycle, they ran her car off the road, they called her names;
and they left a biblical verse in her locker about the need for
women to remain quiet. 1
46
The harassment caused Mrs. Pollard to take a medical
leave of absence so that she could seek psychological assistance,
most people's daily lives, a necessary element of proving a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Toyota Motor
Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)
140 532 U.S. 843 (2001).
141 Id. at 853.
142 Id. at 845.
141 Pollard v. Dupont, 16 F. Supp. 2d 913, (W.D. Tenn. 1998), aff'd 213
F.3d 933 (6th Cir. 2000).
'" Pollard, 532 U.S. at 845.
141 Pollard, 213 F.3d at 933, rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001).
'46 Id. at 938-39.
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prompting her coworkers to hold a party to celebrate her
absence. 147  DuPont managers asked her to return from her
medical leave, despite her doctors' advice, although management
would not change either her shift or her work area. 148 When she
refused to return to work under those circumstances, Ms. Pollard
was dismissed.1 49  Ms. Pollard sued under Title VII, and was
awarded $107,364.00 in back pay and benefits, over $252,997.00
in attorney's fees, and $300,000.00 for compensatory
damages, 150 which under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is the
maximum amount permitted in compensatory damages. 151
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to expand the
remedies available to victims of employment discrimination.
1 52
Prior to 1991, Title VII authorized only injunctions,
reinstatement, back pay, benefits, and attorney's fees. 153  The
1991 amendment expanded those remedies to include the right to
a jury trial and the right to compensatory damages and punitive
damages subject to statutory caps. 154 The number of employees
determines the statutory cap. 155 Based on the fact that DuPont
employed more than 500 employees, the statutory cap that
applied to compensatory damages in this case was
$300,000.00.156 The question presented by the case is whether
front pay constitutes compensatory damages, which would make
such an award subject to the statutory cap of $300,000.00. 157
147 Id at 941.
148 Id.
149 id.
150 Id. at 945.
15 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3) (2001).
152 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2001) provides in pertinent part that: "the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed
in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
153 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §706, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended
in 42 U.S.C. 2000e 5(g)(1)).
154 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, Title I, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072
(1991) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2001)).
155 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(b)(3)(D) (2001).
156 Id.
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With Justice Thomas writing for a unanimous Court, front
pay was determined not to be an element of compensatory
damages and therefore not subject to the statutory cap. 158 Front
pay, we are told, is money awarded for lost compensation during
the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of
reinstatement. 159 Since restatement is not always a viable option,
as where the position no longer exists, or where continued
hostility between the parties makes it inappropriate, front pay can
substitute for reinstatement.1 60 The Court's reasoning was
straightforward: since front pay was virtually universally
recognized as a remedy authorized by Title VII, 161 and since the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was indisputably intended to expand the
remedies available in cases of intentional employment
discrimination, to create additional remedies, it would make no
sense to subject awards of front pay to the caps applicable to
awards of compensatory damages.162 The Act explicitly states
that compensatory damage does not include any type of relief
authorized under pre-existing Title VII law, 163 and since front pay
was a type of relief authorized, it is excluded from the meaning
of compensatory damages and thus not subject to the statutory
cap.16
Justice Thomas justifies treating front pay awards in lieu
of restatement the same as front pay awards from the date of
judgment to the date of reinstatement. 65  He points out that
treating them differently would produce the "strange result that
employees could receive front pay" only when reinstatement is
actually available, but not when reinstatement is not an option,
"whether because of continuing hostility between the parties; or
because of psychological injuries that the discrimination has
caused the plaintiff. Thus, the most egregious offenders could be
... Id. at 847.
159 Id.
160id.
161 Id. at 848.
162 Id. at 853.
163 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b)(2) (2001).
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subject to the least sanctions." 166 That, in the Court's view,
would be a nonsensical result.
While the unanimous decision is a rather straightforward
application of the statutory scheme, it is nevertheless an important
win for victims of sex discrimination, particularly as it relates to
awards of front pay in lieu of reinstatement. How to measure
those damages is a tricky question and one that produces a good
deal of uncertainty. When reinstatement is not an option, what
period of time does the front pay award cover? Can front pay
cover the employee's entire future work expectancy, subject to a
duty to mitigate? Does the collateral source rule apply? These
issues are significant because according to employment litigators,
reinstatement has become increasingly less practical as a remedy,
particularly in sexual harassment hostile work environment
situations. Where reinstatement is not an option, front pay is an
exceedingly important remedy, as evidenced by the fact that Ms.
Pollard will now be seeking an additional award of approximately
$800,000.167
Clark County v. Breedon
Another seemingly straightforward Title VII case, this one
dealing with retaliation, was Clark County v. Breedon.
168
Notwithstanding the fact that the case was decided in a brief per
curiam decision, suggesting that it presented an easy question not
worthy of full briefing or oral arguments, it does raise some
interesting questions.
Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
employee who has brought a Title VII complaint or has otherwise
complained or opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII.
169
What happens when an employee is retaliated against for
166id.
167 Pollard, 532 U.S. at 847. The District Court observed, and the Court of
Appeals agreed, "the $300,000.00 award is, in fact, insufficient to compensate
plaintiff."
168 532 U.S. 268.
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complaining about conduct that does not in fact violate Title VII?
Is that retaliation prohibited by Title VII? Does the answer to
that question turn on whether the employee had a good faith,
albeit mistaken, belief that the practice was unlawful?
Here's a description of the conduct that Shirley Breedon
maintained violated Title VII. Ms. Breedon, her supervisor and
another employee, both males, met to review the psychological
evaluation reports of four job applicants. 170  One of the reports
contained a notation that the applicant had once commented to a
coworker, "I hear making love to you is like making love to the
Grand Canyon." ' 7' Ms. Breedon's supervisor read the notation
aloud, looked at her and said, "I don't know what that
means," 172 and the other employee said, "Well, I'll tell you
later," at which point both men chuckled. 173  Ms. Breedon
complained to several supervisors about this incident, which she
considered to be sexual harassment, and eventually filed a charge
with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the EEOC.
174
Her claim of retaliation in federal court was that she was
transferred in retaliation for her complaints.
175
The district court rejected Ms. Breedon's claim of
retaliation,176 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, applying its rule that
unlawful retaliation occurs when an employer acts against an
employee who has a reasonable good faith belief that her rights
have been violated, even if she is wrong. 177 Without ruling on
the correctness of this rule, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth





175 Breedon v. Clark County, 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000).
176 Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22975 (D.
Nev. 1999) (holding that Breeden "had not shown that any causal connection
exists between her protected activities and the adverse employment decision.")
177 Breeden, 232 F.3d at 894. The Ninth Circuit held that Breeden was
shielded from retaliation only if she had an "objectively reasonable, good faith
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Circuit, finding that no one could reasonably believe that the
incident of which Ms. Breedon complained violated Title VII. 1
78
In so doing, the Court reaffirmed its definition of sexual
harassment, which, to be actionable, must be so severe or
pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment. 179 Quoting its recent
decisions in Faragher v. Boca Raton180 and Harris v. Forklift
Systems, 181 the Court reiterated that workplace conduct must be
measured in context, by "looking at all the circumstances
including the 'frequency of the discriminatory conduct,' its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a
mere offensive utterance and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance'. " 182  Thus, "simple
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious)," will not amount to sexual harassment.1
83
Using that standard, the Court concluded that no
reasonable person could have believed that the single incident
Ms. Breedon complained of violated Title VII.184 Ms. Breedon's
job required her to screen job applicants, which required her to
review the statement contained in the report. 185 The fact that her
supervisor said that he did not know what the comment meant,
that her co-worker said he would explain it later, and that the two
of them chuckled, can hardly be considered an extremely serious
isolated incident constituting prohibited sexual harassment. 
186
A second reason for rejecting Ms. Breedon's claim of
retaliation was her inability to prove causation between her
purportedly protected activities and the adverse action taken
178 Clark County, 532 U.S. at 269.
1 79 Id. at 271.
180 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
1 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
182 Clark County, 532 U.S. at 271 (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88
(quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23)).
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against her. 187  The evidence established that Ms. Breedon's
supervisors had been contemplating transferring her before they
knew of the federal suit.188 The Court held that "employers need
not suspend previously planned transfers upon discovering that a
Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines
previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined,
is not evidence of causality.' 89 As for the fact that the employer
knew two years before the transfer that plaintiff had filed an
EEOC complaint, the Court stated that while there are cases
finding causality based on the temporal proximity between an
employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse
employment action, the temporal proximity must be very close. 190
"Action taken [as here] twenty months later suggests, by itself,
no causality at all." 191
The Supreme Court does not directly pass on the Ninth
Circuit rule which extends the protection of Title VII to
retaliation against an employee for activity that the employee
wrongly, but in good faith believes is protected under Title
VII. 92 Does the viability of anti-discrimination statutes require
the protection of all those who are colorably aggrieved? The
answer seems to be yes. Thus, the Second Circuit has held that
"To, establish that an activity is protected, a plaintiff need only
prove that she was acting under a good faith belief that the
activity was of the kind covered by the statute." 193 That is also
the rule that the New York courts have applied in interpreting the
New York Human Rights Law. 194 It remains to be seen whether
the Supreme Court will ultimately interpret Title VII that way.
187 Id. at 273.
188 Id.
89 Clark County, 532 U.S. at 274.
'90 Id. at 273.
'91 Id. at 274.
192 id.
193 Cosgrove v. Sears Roebuck, 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Conclusion
Of the five civil rights cases that have been presented, a
scorecard would indicate a good year for discrimination
claimants, who won three out of five. But, that would be
accurate merely from a quantitative viewpoint. A qualitative
perspective would probably conclude that subjecting all
employment contracts to the Federal Arbitration Act and refusing
to permit private causes of action to remedy disparate impact
discrimination in federally funded programs and activities made
for a good year for discrimination defendants.
27
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